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CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS: JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES UNDER THE
NONRESIDENT MOTORIST CONSENT
STATUTES
Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.1958)
Plaintiffs, Florida residents, while operating an automobile in
Missouri, collided with an automobile owned and operated by a
Kansas resident. The latter died prior to suit. Plaintiffs sued the
nonresident executor of decedent's estate, using substituted service as
allowed by a Missouri statute.' The case was removed to the federal
district court, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal, HELD, substituted service on a foreign
personal representative under the Missouri nonresident motorist consent statute is sufficient to give the Missouri courts jurisdiction over
the personal representative and is not violative of due process. Reversed and remanded.
During the early history of the automobile, the victim of a nonresident motorist's negligence was often forced to pursue the tortfeasor to another jurisdiction if he wished to litigate his claim. This
was necessary because "due process of law" required that a defendant
in an action in personam be subjected to a court's jurisdiction only
if he voluntarily appeared or was served with process within the jurisdiction. 2 The first state to enact a statute to provide a convenient
method of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign motorists was New
Jersey in 1908. 3 This nonresident motorist consent statute was based
on the theory that by use of a state's highways a foreign motorist
consents to the appointment of a resident state official as his agent for
service of process. The constitutionality of a similar statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski4 against
'Mo. REv. STAT. §506.210 (Supp. 1957) provides that a nonresident motorist
consents that he, his executor, administrator, or other legal representative shall
be subject to civil action in Missouri by service of process on the secretary of
state.
2Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3N.J. Laws c. 304, §4 (1908).
4274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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an attack based on violation of due process of law, and soon thereafter every state and the District of Columbia enacted similar statutes.
These statutes did not provide a method of relief if the nonresident motorist died. Substituted service on the nonresident's personal
representative was held not to give jurisdiction in the absence of
express statutory authority.5 The first state to remedy this defect
was Maryland in 1939. 6 Today twenty-three states have enacted the
so-called long arm service statute by amending the basic consent
statute.7 Florida enacted such an amendment in 1949.8
With one exception, 9 the courts have consistently upheld the
validity of these statutes.' 0 Defendants have unsuccessfully contended
that they are unconstitutional as a violation of due process of law
and that they conflict with a fundamental agency principle. The
latter objection is based on the common law rule that generally an
agency relationship is terminated on the principal's death."1 This
contention is overcome by the statutes themselves, which provide that
12
the agency shall not terminate on the death of the principal.
The due process argument has also been consistently rejected by
state and lower federal courts.' 3 This objection involves the contention that the action is one in rem that if allowed would create
a right against the decedent's estate, which is property wholly within
another jurisdiction. This argument was accepted by a federal district
court in Knoop v. Anderson. 4 However, the other courts that have
5E.g., Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N.Y. Supp. 537 (2d Dep't
1936); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943).
6MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §189 (1939).
7Ark., Calif., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo., Neb., N.M.,
N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Pa., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Va., Wis., and Wyo.
SFLA. STAT. §47.29(2) (1957): "If any person upon whom service of process is
authorized by subsection (1) shall die, service shall be made upon his administrator,
executor, curator or personal representative in the manner prescribed by §47.30."
9Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
loBrooks v. National Bank, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958), reversing 152 F. Supp.
36 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1952); Oviatt v.
Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943); Plopa v. Du Pre, 328 Mich. 660, 42
N.W.2d 777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950); Tarczynski v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 261 Wis. 149, 52 N.W.2d 396 (1952).
"See MEmCmH, LAW OF AGENCY 183 (4th ed. 1952).
12E.g., Oviatt v. Garretson, supra note 10; Leighton v. Roper, supra note 10;
see 25 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 907 (1950).
"sSee note 10 supra.
'471 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947), 61 HARv. L. Rav. 355 (1948); 15 U. CH. L.
Rxv. 451 (1948); 57 YA
L.J. 647 (1948).
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passed on this question have rejected it, either by denying that the
action is purely in rem15 or by stating that this extension of jurisdiction
16
is a valid exercise of the state's police power.
A third argument that has been raised against these statutes is
that by the law of administration of estates a personal representative is an officer of the court that appoints him and that he generally
may not sue or be sued in another jurisdiction. 7 Again the courts
have relied on the police power to resolve this conflict of laws.1s As
stated by the New York court in Leighton v. Roper:19
"[Tlhe concept of jurisdiction over a decedent's estate in the
field of estate law must yield in this case to the exercise by
New York of its police power in a field undeniably its own, in
the limited respect provided .... "
When a court renders a judgment against a foreign personal representative based on jurisdiction obtained under a long arm service
statute, should the sister state in which the probate proceeding is
pending afford the judgment full faith and credit? The Knoop case
and the district court in the instant case2 0 stated that full faith and
credit need not be given such a judgment, since the long arm amendment did not give valid jurisdiction over the foreign personal representative. The courts upholding the statutes have purposely avoided
the full faith and credit issue. 21 The instant case followed earlier
decisions in stating that the enforceability of the judgment must be
determined by the courts of the state in which the probate proceeding
is pending.22 At least one writer has taken the position that such
judgments should not be given full faith and credit by the personal
representative's jurisdiction. 23 His conclusion is based solely on the
l5Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
'6See note 10 supra.
l7Vaughan v. Northup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y.
379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §190 (3d ed. 1949);
McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 79 (1957); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS §512 (1934).

IsSee note 10 supra.
19300 N.Y. 434, 443, 91 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1950).
2OBrooks v. National Bank, 152 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
2See note 10 supra.
22At 42.
2McDoWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 104 (1957).
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general rule that a personal representative may not be sued, even if
he consents, in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he is appointed. However, the doctrine of full faith and credit requires only
that the rendering state have jurisdiction. 24 Since numerous state
and federal courts have held the jurisdiction of the rendering court
to be valid in these cases, 25 it is submitted that these judgments should
26
be given full faith and credit. As pointed out in the instant case:
"If public policy requires that jurisdiction over the nonresident motorist exist in cases in which such motorist survives,
it is apparent that the same public policy for protection of
the residents of the State against the negligent driving of the
nonresident motorist would exist in the case of serious accidents causing loss of life."
The importance of the full faith and credit problem will diminish as the incidence of liability insurance increases and as more
states enact the long arm statutes. If the decedent had liability insurance with a company doing business in the resident state, enforcement of the judgment presents no problem. Also, if the state
in which the judgment must be enforced has enacted a long arm
statute, it will probably enforce the judgment as a matter of comity.
The trend indicated by the instant case is dearly a desirable one;
the innocent victim of the negligence of a deceased nonresident
motorist should not be forced to the expense of suing in another
jurisdiction. The number of states recently enacting these long arm
amendments and the cases upholding them indicate that there is
little question that they are valid and that other states will give them
full faith and credit.

G. L. REEvEs, JR.

24Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 264 (1890).
25See note 10 supra.
26At 41.
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